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I. Introduction
In various incarnations, egalitarianism has been a fundamental concern of 
economic policy for most of the twentieth century.1 The egalitarian 
impulse—and its corollary, opposition to the stark inequalities of free 
market capitalism—was embodied in both Soviet-style socialism and social-
democratic Keynesianism as they developed, primarily in the first quarter-
century after the end of World War II. Both models achieved major successes 
in a range of countries, especially through the 1960s. Countries with Soviet-
type economies attained high growth rates and the majority of people living 
in them enjoyed rising living standards, including income, job, health and 
housing security. The social-democratic/Keynesian approach also succeeded 
in reducing inequality, increasing security, as well as contributing to the 
dampening of the capitalist business cycle.2
However, both models also contained several basic contradictions. Among 
the most evident were the dictatorial political foundations of the Soviet
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model and its related incapacity to shift from an initial phase of large-
scale industrialization to one based on innovations in production pro-
cesses and product designs. For its part, the Keynesian model has been 
unable to reverse the trends of declining growth and increased mass 
unemployment in advanced economies. The Soviet model has completely 
collapsed under the weight of such contradictions and social-democratic 
Keynesianism has been in eclipse since the 1970s.3 Neither model now 
offers a viable basis for a renewed egalitarian project.
Progressive political movements have been weakened by the absence of 
coherent egalitarian economic programmes. In this absence, progressive 
movements are unable to specify a broad-based policy agenda they 
support. Such a lacuna is especially damaging given that support for the 
Left has again begun to grow, as the full implications of Reaganism, 
Thatcherism, IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes and 
Eastern European free-market shock therapy are no longer matters of 
speculation.
This paper pursues a new approach to egalitarian economic policy. It is 
concerned with methods of bringing dramatic increases in the democra-
tic control over financial markets and the allocation of credit, without 
sacrificing the basic sources of micro efficiency and macro coordination 
and stability that are necessary for any viable economic strategy. The 
focus here on financial issues is not meant to suggest that there is less 
need for comparable policy measures in other economic spheres, in par-
ticular the labour market and related institutions. Nevertheless, the 
premise of this paper is that policies focused on financial institutions 
and activities must be a central feature of any renewed egalitarian policy 
project.
There are several reasons why this is so. To begin with, it has been clear 
for some time that even the most mildly progressive governments face 
formidable opposition to their programmes from powerful interests 
within financial markets. Some well-known examples of this recurring 
phenomenon include the Labour governments in Britain in the 1930s, 
1960s and 1970s, the Mitterand government in France in the 1980s, and,
1 I wish to thank the following people for their stimulating comments on this 
work: Philip Arestis, Dean Baker, Fred Block, Bob Brenner, Jerry Epstein, 
Andrew Glyn, Ilene Grabel, John Grahl, Marty Hart-Landsberg, Michael Howard, 
Makoto Itoh, John King, seminar participants at the Universities of Vermont, 
Cambridge, and California-Riverside, and participants at the September 1994
conference on ‘Demand Rehabilitation: Finance, Trade and Technology’, spon-
sored by Pantheon Sorbonne Paris 1 and SOAS, University of London. I am also 
grateful for my graduate students at UC-Riverside for moving with me into this 
topic. A shorter version is being published by International Papers in Political 
Economy.
2 Some standard evidence on these indicators is summarized in Robert Pollin and 
Alexander Cockburn, ‘Capitalism and its Spectres: The World, the Free Market 
and the Left’, The Nation, 21 February 1991, pp. 224–36.
3 See Perry Anderson and Patrick Camiller, eds, Mapping the West European Left,
London, Verso 1994, and Andrew Glyn, ‘Social Democracy and Full 
Employment’, NLR, no. 211, pp. 33–55 for a range of perspectives on the condi-
tion of West European social democracy.
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most recently, the Clinton Presidency in the US.4 Third World govern-
ments regularly confront even stronger pressures, especially since the 
1980s, as the IMF and World Bank have imposed deflationary structural 
adjustment programmes on terms established by the international finan-
cial community.
But even assuming that such political forces could be neutralized, the ten-
dency of financial markets toward speculation and instability have also 
weakened the capacity of governments to successfully implement 
egalitarian macroeconomic policies. The primary instruments for con-
ducting macro policy—deficit spending and central bank monetary inter-
ventions—are both financial mechanisms, and thus their ability to operate 
effectively depends on how well policy initiatives can be transmitted 
through the financial system. Financial market instability has increased 
substantially since the early 1970s relative to the first phase of the postwar 
period, including such period-defining events as the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the Latin American debt crisis 
in the early 1980s, and the merger and takeover wave in the US and UK in 
the latter part of the 1980s. This rise of financial instability has weakened 
the transmission mechanism from policy instruments to policy targets.
Given these considerations, it follows that egalitarian movements will 
have to confront financial market pressures through explicit program-
matic measures. Yet, in contrast to the situation with labour-market issues, 
the Left has for the most part failed to even consider seriously the types 
of policies that might be effective in addressing both the political and 
structural problems deriving from financial markets. There are also more 
positive reasons for egalitarians to pay attention to polices focused on the 
financial system. Finance is the conduit for all economic activity in market 
economies. Because nothing happens unless it is financed, exerting 
control over the financial system is an efficient way to influence the widest 
possible range of activity with a set of relatively modest and simple policy 
tools.
Moreover, many researchers have now observed that there are consider-
able differences in the financial systems operating within the various 
capitalist economies. What has emerged from this research is that some 
financial systems—in particular what are often called the ‘bank-based’ 
systems—have been more successful than others—the ‘capital market-
based’ systems—in promoting long-term growth and financial stability. 
The basis for the success of the bank-based systems is their reliance on 
non-market arrangements in organizing financial institutions. These non-
market arrangements continue to operate, moreover, despite the wave of 
financial market globalization and liberalization that has been gaining
4 The Clinton administration’s abdication before financial market pressures is 
chronicled in great detail in Bob Woodward, The Agenda, New York 1994. 
Woodward portrays both Clinton and the relatively progressive members of his 
administration as truly stunned by the power of financial markets to override his 
electoral mandate. Clinton, for example, at one point declares, ‘You mean to tell 
me that the success of the program and my reelection hinges on the Federal 
Reserve and a bunch of fucking bond traders?’ (p. 84). He later concludes, ‘Here 
we help the bond market and we hurt the people who voted us in.’ (p. 91.)
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momentum at least since the collapse of Bretton Woods. While these 
bank-based systems have not been constructed to advance egalitarian 
aims, the principle argument of the paper is that they can be successfully 
adapted for that purpose once their central operating mechanisms are 
understood and appropriately redeployed.
Following this introduction, the paper is organized into three main sec-
tions. Section two surveys the literature on bank-based and capital-market 
based financial systems. In general, this literature finds that bank-based 
systems, such as those in Japan, France, Germany and South Korea have 
been more successful than capital market-based systems, such as those as 
in the US and UK, in solving the incentive, coordination and informational 
problems inherent in capitalist economies, and indeed in all complex eco-
nomic systems. Because of this, bank-based systems are better equipped 
to promote longer time horizons and a stable financial environment. 
Their structures also create more favourable conditions for activist 
government policy interventions, including both traditional macro poli-
cies and public credit allocation policies. At the same time, the bank-based 
systems generally operate through highly undemocratic public and private 
bureaucracies, which are clearly inimical to any egalitarian policy project. 
The challenge, then, is to develop policy approaches which can combine 
the efficiency-promoting aspects of bank-based systems with a degree of 
democratic participation in the financial system not yet attempted in exist-
ing models.
Section three takes up this challenge. The angle through which it 
approaches this issue is to reexamine the different financial systems 
according to the exit/voice analytic framework developed by Hirschman.5
In this framework, exit is the withdrawal from a relationship with a person 
or organization when one becomes dissatisfied with that relationship. 
Voice means directly expressing one’s dissatisfaction to the relevant 
person or organization. In capitalist societies, the exercise of exit is per-
vasive within market relationships, while the political and bureaucratic 
spheres are dominated by the exercise of voice. Within this framework, 
the fundamental distinction between financial systems can be seen to be 
not whether they are bank- or capital market-based, but rather whether 
they are dominated by exit or voice mechanisms. The bank-based systems 
are voice-led, and therefore provide more effective channels for political 
interventions in financial markets than do the exit-led capital market 
systems. Working from this perspective, the principal concern in formu-
lating egalitarian policies can be recast: the issue is not the specific bank or 
capital market institutions prevailing in a financial system, but rather how 
all systems can be restructured to provide an effective basis for the demo-
cratic exercise of voice.
Posing the question in this way, then, enables us to consider various 
means of creating ‘democratic-voice’ mechanisms that also retain the effi-
ciency and stability-promoting aspects of the existing bank-based finan-
cial structures, that is, the ‘elite voice’ systems. Drawing primarily from 
recent literature on the US economy, I consider proposals in the areas of
5 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States, Cambridge, Mass. 1970.
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corporate governance, community reinvestment, pension-fund manage-
ment, and central bank policy. However, I also stress that such democra-
tic credit policies can be effective within a range of institutional 
frameworks and political environments. Indeed, the adaptability of this 
policy approach is one of its most important strengths. For example, 
while such proposals have operated successfully on a limited scale within 
the contemporary US economy, their effectiveness would probably 
increase within an economy, such as the French, where a high proportion 
of the major financial institutions are publicly owned.
In section four, I pose the following more general question: can the effi-
ciency and stability-promoting features of a voice-led model be sustained 
once we move from an elite to a democratic-voice system? I approach the 
issue via the new model of ‘bank-centric’ market socialism developed by 
Bardhan and Roemer.6 Working from their discussion provides a bridge for 
engaging with the literature on market socialism in order to explore our 
central concerns about the efficacy of a democratic-voice model.
The brief concluding section pulls together the main arguments in support 
of such democratic-voice financial policies as a foundation for renewing 
egalitarian economic policies. In passing, this section notes that globaliza-
tion and liberalization of financial markets pose new challenges to the 
viability of any bank-based or voice-led financial system. At the same time, 
experiences thus far suggest ways that the essential features of a voice 
system can be retained without having to resist all aspects of globalization.
II. Alternative Capitalist Financial Systems
1. Bank- and Capital Market-Based Systems
Beginning with Gershenkron’s classic essay, there has been a small but now 
rapidly growing body of economic analysis which has attached significance 
to differences in the financial systems of capitalist countries.7
Gershenkron, in particular, contrasted the financial development of 
Britain and Germany. He argued that, because Britain’s industrialization 
was early and gradual, businesses were financed primarily through rein-
vesting retained earnings. Large pools of intermediated saving had not yet 
formed, making it impractical for firms to rely on external sources for long-
term financing. As a result, in the British tradition, non-financial firms did 
not develop close ties with financial institutions. When large financial 
institutions did later begin to develop, they were independent entities, with 
no special attachment to firms. The arm’s length relationship between 
Britain’s non-financial and financial sectors established the foundation for 
the country’s highly developed and independent capital market.8
6 Pranab Bardhan and John Roemer, ‘Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, 1992, pp. 101–16.
7 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,
Cambridge, Mass. 1962.
8 Tom Nairn traces the origins of the weak linkages between industry and finance 
in Britain even further back, to the era of the English revolution, during which the 
old landed classes and finance capital united to prevent the industrial bourgeoisie 
from controlling the state. Nairn, ‘The Decline of the British State’, NLR, 101–102, 
February–April 1977, pp. 3–61.
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Gershenkron contrasts this pattern with that of Germany. 
Industrialization started later there, and as a result, firms were confronted 
with the problem of rapidly appropriating the capital technologies and 
production systems, such as those for steel, that the British had already 
developed. The firms were unable to finance these projects on their own 
and, as a result, large universal banks developed. They provided firms 
with both long-term funding as well as managerial direction. The uni-
versal banks were also able to coordinate the investment plans for the 
clusters of firms with which they were associated. Within this develop-
ment path, opportunities were far more limited than in Britain for the 
formation of an independent capital market.9
As Jacobs points out, Gershenkron’s account does not attempt to explain 
why the differences in the British and German systems were sustained 
long after Germany attained a comparable level of development to that of 
Britain.10 Nor does he pass judgement on the relative merits of either 
system as a foundation for future development. However, in roughly the 
last decade, a substantial literature has developed which has raised just 
these questions.11 This literature has examined a wider set of countries 
than those considered by Gershenkron, including the US, Japan and
9 Gershenkron’s historical account of the German experience conforms to the 
contemporaneous observations of Rudolph Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study of 
the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development, London 1981 (first ed. 1891). However, 
Hilferding’s analytic approach was mistaken for having regarded the German uni-
versal banking model as a more advanced and essentially inevitable stage through 
which capitalist economies would proceed. This perspective underestimated the 
durability of the British-type capital market model, as well as the evolution of 
banking enterprises themselves. Laurence Harris provides a good discussion of 
these issues. ‘Alternative Perspectives on the Financial System’, L. Harris, J. 
Coakley, M. Croasdale, and T. Evans, eds, New Perspectives on the Financial System,
New York 1988, pp. 7–38.
10 Michael P. Jacobs, ‘National Financial Systems, Aggregate Investment, and the 
Cost of Capital’, manuscript, Department of Economics, New School for Social 
Research, 1994. This is comparable to the argument Ben Fine and Laurence Harris 
make about Nairn’s thesis on the UK system—i.e. Nairn does not adequately 
explain why the British system remained in place through various historical junc-
tures when political opportunities existed for restructuring it. The Peculiarities of the 
British Economy, London 1985.
11 Some of the leading studies in this literature include John Zysman, Government,
Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change, Ithaca, 1983;
Tad M. Rybczynski, ‘Industrial Finance Systems in Europe, US and Japan’, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 5, nos. 3–4, (1984) pp. 275–86; Andrew 
Cox, ‘The State, Finance and Industry Relationship in Comparative Perspective’, 
in A. Cox, ed., The State, Finance and Industry, Sussex 1986, pp. 1–59; Colin Mayer, 
for instance, ‘New Issues in Corporate Finance’, European Economic Review, 32, 
(1988) pp. 1167–89; Eric Berglöf, ‘Capital Structure as a Mechanism of Control: A 
Comparison of Financial Systems’, in M. Aoki, B. Gustafsson and O.E. 
Williamson, eds, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, London 1989, pp. 237–62; and 
Michael Porter, for instance The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York 1992.
Will Hutton’s The State We’re In, London 1995, is an excellent journalistic discus-
sion of these issues, particularly as they relate to the contemporary British 
economy. Recent studies examining these questions from political economy per-
spectives, and from which I have benefited substantially are Don Goldstein, 
‘Financial Structure and Corporate Behavior in Japan and the US: Insulation vs. 
Integration with Speculative Pressures’, manuscript, Department of Economics,
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France among the core group, and others as well, depending on the par-
ticular questions that a given study is pursuing.
This recent literature has continued to find useful the fundamental dis-
tinctions established by Gershenkron, between what we are calling ‘bank-
based’ and ‘capital-market based’ financial systems. Most generally, the 
capital market-based systems are characterized by highly developed 
capital markets, with widely dispersed ownership of equity and debt 
instruments, and relatively low involvement of large banks in either the 
allocation of funds or the ownership of financial assets. The bank-based 
systems, by contrast, are characterized by a small number of universal 
banks that are actively involved in the long-term financing of investment 
activity of the non-financial firms. The banks are the primary source of 
long-term funds and they retain ownership for the long term of their debt 
instruments. In these economies, there is relatively little secondary trading 
of financial assets.
Beyond this, Zysman’s seminal contribution added a third dimension to 
the distinction between these systems: the nature of government involve-
ment within them.12 Zysman found strong differences in the role of 
government between Japan, France, Germany, the UK and US, the five 
countries he studied. In particular, he found that the government played a 
more limited role in the US and UK capital market-based systems. France 
and Japan, by contrast, were bank-based systems in which the government 
participates actively in allocating credit to private firms, both on the basis 
of price and quantity controls. Zysman argues that Germany is unique as 
a bank-based system in which the government does not play an active role 
in administering prices or quantities.
In contrasting the systems below, we begin by describing specific institu-
tional features—that is, what distinguishes them as either bank or capital 
market-based—but advance toward the goal of generalizing more broadly 
about the two types of systems. I thus also describe the differences 
between the systems according to whether they are ‘fluid’ (capital market) 
or ‘dedicated’ (bank-based), and then, more expansively, according to 
whether they are ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ led systems. At the same time, in general-
izing this way about the nature of these systems, I do not mean to give the 
impression that actual financial operations in the various countries have, 
over the period considered, become frozen in place. At various points, 
particularly in the conclusion, I discuss some of the ways that these 
systems have recently evolved. Nor am I suggesting that differences in 
financial systems can themselves explain overall differences in economic 
performance. The Japanese or South Korean growth ‘miracles’, for 
example, were crucially dependent on, among other things, initial support
Allegheny College, 1995; Ilene Grabel, ‘Saving and the Financing of Productive 
Investment: The Importance of National Financial Complexes’, in R. Pollin ed., 
The Macroeconomics of Finance, Saving and Investment, Ann Arbor 1996 (forthcoming); 
and Michael P. Jacobs, ‘National Financial Systems, Aggregate Investment, and 
the Cost of Capital’ and ‘A Cluster Analysis of Twelve Countries’ Financial 
Systems’, Essay I, Ph.D. Dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1994.
12 John Zysman, Government, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of 
Industrial Change, Ithaca, NY 1983.
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from the US economy through spending on the Korean and Vietnam wars 
and other factors, docile labour movements, well-specified export strate-
gies, and strong commitments to spending on education.13 Nevertheless, 
by focusing here on the issue of financial structure, I am clearly assigning 
considerable significance to its relative importance as a determinant of 
overall economic performance.
2. Effects of Alternative Systems
Why do these features of countries’ financial systems matter? The answer 
first depends on the theoretical perspective from which one examines the 
question. Given the neoclassical ‘irrelevance’ propositions developed by 
Modigliani and Miller, financial structure should not matter at all in deter-
mining either the valuation of firms or, more generally, the pattern of 
investment.14 This is because, in perfectly competitive markets, the same 
product (a firm) will be priced equally in separate markets (debt and equity 
markets). So there can be no advantage to firms or their asset holders 
derived from the firm’s capital structure.
Because the Modigliani-Miller thesis assumes the existence of perfectly 
competitive markets, it follows that ‘financial deepening’—the develop-
ment of sophisticated financial markets through which the transaction 
costs of reaching one’s optimal risk/reward profile are low—will enhance 
efficiency. This was the view developed by MacKinnon and Shaw specif-
ically with respect to the financial markets of less developed economies, 
but their perspective applies generally.15 From this point of view, then, 
one would conclude that the Anglo-Saxon capital market-based model of 
deep and liberalized financial markets would attain superior results to the 
bank-based systems such as France, Japan or Germany. In fact, most of 
the literature has found the contrary to be the case: over a range of mea-
sures, the bank-based systems have out-performed the capital market-
based systems. What are the reasons for this?
13 For fuller treatments of these economies, see Makoto Itoh, The World Economic 
Crisis and Japanese Capitalism, New York 1990 on Japan, and Alice Amsden, Asia’s 
Next Giant, New York 1989, Martin Hart-Landsberg, The Rush to Development:
Economic Change and Political Struggle in South Korea, New York 1993 and Ha-Joon 
Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy, New York 1994 on South Korea. 
14 Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance, and the Theory of Investment’, American Economic Review, June 1958, pp. 
261–95.
15 See Ronald MacKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development, Washington, 
DC, 1973, and Edward S. Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development, New 
York 1973. Grabel presents, among other things, an illuminating survey of the 
MacKinnon/Shaw thesis. Ilene Grabel, ‘Speculation-led Economic Development: 
A Post-Keynesian Interpretation of Financial Liberalization Programs in the 
Third World’, International Review of Applied Economics, vol. 9, no. 2, (1995), pp. 
127–49. It is notable that MacKinnon himself has revised his position allowing 
that some forms of state intervention may be needed to address problems of 
asymmetric information. See for instance his ‘Macroeconomic Instability and 
Moral Hazard in Banking in a Liberalizing Economy’, in P. Brock, M. Connolly 
and C. Gonzalez-Vega, eds, Latin American Debt and Adjustment. External Shocks and 
Macroeconomic Policies, London 1989, pp. 99–111.
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The literature here builds from a range of perspectives. Some of it, within 
the Gershenkron tradition, is primarily historical and descriptive (for 
instance Zysman and Cox). More explicit theoretical approaches are moti-
vated by New Keynesian and New Institutionalist concerns with prob-
lems of information and principal/agent relationships, Post-Keynesian 
ideas on uncertainty and financial fragility, and from what is increasingly 
termed the ‘organizational capabilities’ view of the firm.16 Perhaps the 
single most influential idea underlying this literature is traceable to Berle 
and Means’s classic 1932 study of the development of US corporations.17
They argued that the growth of the corporate form of organization 
would encourage a divergence in the interests of managers and owners—
what is now termed a principal/agent problem. The problem is that man-
agers, as agents of a dispersed and unorganized set of owners within a
capital market-based financial system, will act on behalf of their own 
interests which are not necessarily identical to, or even compatible with, 
those of the firm’s owners. Managers, for example, may seek to maximize 
their own salary, security, power and perquisites, rather than the share-
holder’s value; this would constitute a classic instance of an incentive 
incompatibility between principal and agent.
At least equally problematic is that, even if the Berle/Means-type incen-
tive incompatibilities were resolved satisfactorily, this in itself is still not 
likely to promote the long-term viability of the firm. The reasons for this 
stem from the related problems of asymmetric information between 
owners and managers, incentive incompatibilities between owners and the 
firms workers, and the uncertainty that dominates the operations of 
financial markets. To begin with, the information to which the sharehold-
ers tend to respond will be short-term financial indicators. These are not 
necessarily congruent with the firm’s ability to produce desired products 
at competitive costs, the basic determinant of the firm’s long-term viabil-
ity. Shareholders will recognize obvious cost-reducing measures, such as 
wage cuts or layoffs, and will respond favourably to these. Yet other 
sources of long-term viability, such as the firm’s capacity to innovate tech-
nically and its ability to create a productive environment for its workers,
16 Stiglitz is a background reference on New Keynesian perspectives on informa-
tional problems and financial structure. See for instance Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Banks 
vs. Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment’, in J.A.
Roumasset and S. Barr, eds, The Economics of Cooperation: EastAsian Development and 
the Case for Pro-Market Intervention, Boulder, 1992, pp. 15–38. For a discussion of 
Post-Keynesian perspectives on uncertainty and financial fragility, see James 
Crotty, ‘Are Keynesian Uncertainty and Macrotheory Compatible? Conventional 
Decision Making, Institutional Structures and Conditional Stability in Keynesian 
Macromodels’, in. G. Dymski and R. Pollin, eds, New Perspectives in Monetary 
Macroeconomics: Explorations in the Tradition of Hyman P. Minsky, Ann Arbor, 1994, 
pp. 105–142. For alternative versions of an ‘organizational capabilities’ view, see 
Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York 1990; and William 
Lazonick, ‘Organizational Capabilities in American Industry: The Rise and 
Decline of Managerial Capitalism’, Business and Economic History, (second series) 
19, 1990, pp. 35–54, and ‘Controlling the Market for Corporate Control: The 
Historical Significance of Managerial Capitalism’, Industrial and Corporate Change,
vol. 1, no. 3, (1992) pp. 445–88.
17 Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, New York 1932.
are likely to be unrewarded or even denigrated by shareholders. This is in 
part a problem of asymmetric information, in that shareholders are not 
adequately informed about the firm’s operations. But there is also the 
perhaps more basic problem of incentive incompatibilities, or, in 
straightforward terms, class conflict. Since longer-term sources of pro-
ductive viability may not reduce costs in the short term, the benefits of 
them will not flow to shareholders who are most interested in the short-
term capital gains stemming from rising asset prices. On the other hand, 
the benefits of maintaining competitiveness through creating a pro-
ductive work environment rather than wage-cutting and layoffs is clearly 
in the interest of the firm’s workers.
Finally, as Post Keynesians have long argued, asset prices in deep capital 
markets are heavily influenced, if not entirely dominated, by the activities 
of speculators, whose only concern is to outguess the market, not evalu-
ate a firm’s productive potential.18 Thus, far from enhancing the flow of 
useful information between owners and managers, a deep and freely func-
tioning financial market is more likely to encourage chronic bouts of 
speculative financial excess or, in contemporary terminology, pervasive 
‘coordination failures’.
The argument within the literature is that the bank-based systems resolve 
these problems of asymmetric information, uncertainty and coordination 
failure, as well as class conflict and other incentive incompatibilities more 
successfully than the capital market-based systems. As a result, the bank-
based systems achieve superior performance in three crucial areas: pro-
moting longer time horizons, encouraging financial stability, and 
providing a framework for the successful implementation of government 
policy.
3. Time Horizons and Financial Stability
The most basic reason given in the literature for the superior performance 
of the bank-based systems is that they foster long-term time horizons, 
which in turn promote long-term productive investment. By contrast, the 
capital market-based systems foster shorter time horizons, in that firms’ 
managers are primarily concerned with achieving the performance stan-
dards defined by the transactions-oriented capital markets.
It will be useful now to consider Porter’s terminology, in which the two 
systems are distinguished according to whether they are ‘fluid’ or ‘dedi-
cated’ capital systems. In the fluid capital systems, firms’ relationships 
with capital suppliers are at arm’s length, so shareholders have limited 
information and direct influence over managerial actions. Shareholders 
and bondholders’ decisions are made on the basis of simple corporate 
financial ratios and stock prices. Moreover, their interventions in the cor-
porate governance process are primarily ex-post, for instance through the 
sale of shares or the deterioration in bond ratings. Within this arrange-
ment, managers are forced to follow the same standard financial measures 
of performance.
18 This point is developed well in James Crotty, ‘Are Keynesian Uncertainty and 
Macrotheory Compatible?
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In ‘dedicated capital’ systems, by contrast, the capital suppliers have 
major stakes and long-term relationships with the non-financial firms. 
This enables the capital suppliers to share a focus with managers on 
technical expertise and building market positions. Capital suppliers are 
thus able to exert ex-ante influence. The firms, in turn, benefit from 
what Lazonick calls ‘financial commitment’, which he defines as a situa-
tion in which claimants to the firms’ revenues ‘will not enforce these 
claims in ways that undermine the development and utilization of the 
firms’ organizational capabilities’.19 With this type of financial commit-
ment associated with dedicated capital systems, the factors that are 
conducive to high performance among workers—including less hierar-
chical work structures and long-term employment security—have a far 
greater opportunity to develop. In addition, the ex-ante flow of 
information and control in dedicated capital systems induces a greater 
tolerance on the part of the lenders and investors for higher leverage 
ratios. At the same time, the capital market-based systems are more sus-
ceptible to financial instability than the bank-based systems. Why is this 
so? The underlying source of financial instability, at the simplest level 
of accounting, must be that debt commitments are systematically out-
stripping the income flows necessary to service them. In turn, the basic 
explanation for the systematic deviation between debt commitments 
and income flows is that borrowed funds are used disproportionately 
to finance activities that do not yield an adequate return flow of 
income. The types of debt-financed activities most likely to create such 
a debt trap are speculative and compensatory spending, that is, bor-
rowing to purchase existing assets with the expectation of capital gain 
and to compensate for declining income streams or other internally 
generated funds. Put another way, instability results when debt is used 
insufficiently to finance productive spending, that is, spending that 
raises incomes by enhancing the productive capacity of firms and indi-
viduals. When credit is extended for speculative and compensatory 
spending to a disproportionate degree relative to productive spending, 
the likely result will be income streams inadequate to finance the 
growth of debt.20 Note here that the basic source of difficulties is not 
the rise of debt per se, nor even the rise of debt relative to income or 
assets. High leverage ratios are sustainable as long as, over time, a 
return flow of revenue is generated to service them.
As a general model, the bank-based systems are better designed to 
avoid such mismatches between debt commitments and income flows 
since, with finances more committed to long-term projects, speculative 
impulses are weakened. This in turn means that projects will have a 
longer grace period before they have to generate returns to their 
lenders.
19 Lazonick, ‘Organizational Capabilities in American Industry’, p. 51.
20 The most influential contemporary perspective on financial instability has been 
developed by Hyman P. Minsky, for instance in Stabilizing an Unstable Economy,
New Haven, 1986. For various perspectives on and developments from the 
Minsky approach, see Steven Fazzari and Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, eds, Financial
Conditions and Macroeconomic Performance: Essays in Honor of Hyman P. Minsky,
Armonk, NY 1992, and Gary Dymski and Robert Pollin, eds, New Perspectives in 
Monetary Macroeconomics: Explorations in the Tradition of Hyman P. Minsky, Ann Arbor,
1994.
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4. Evidence on Time Horizons and Financial Stability 
Time Horizons, Cost of Capital and Investment
A wide range of research has accumulated in recent years supporting the 
view that the bank-based systems have promoted longer time horizons 
and greater financial stability. To begin with, survey evidence of corporate 
chief executive officers (CEOs) in the US, Japan and Europe developed by 
Poterba and Summers found that American CEOs believe that their time 
horizons are shorter than those for their counterparts in Europe and 
Japan.21 These managers claim that their relatively short horizons derive 
to a significant extent from the financial market environment in which 
they operate, since they believe that US equity markets undervalue long-
term investments. Were the firms valued more in accordance with the per-
ceptions of managers, they believe that their long-term investments 
would increase, on average, by perhaps as much as 20 per cent.
The survey also found that for the US CEOs, the minimum expected rate of 
return that would induce them to commit to a new investment project—
i.e. the ‘hurdle rate’—is substantially higher than standard cost-of-capital 
analysis would suggest. On average, CEOs in the US reported that their 
hurdle rate was 12.2 per cent. This compares with an average real return 
over the past fifty years of less than 2 per cent on corporate bonds and 
around 7 per cent for equities.
Moreover, as Porter reports, this difference in time frames and hurdle 
rates is associated with a striking difference in managerial goals: US man-
agers rank return on investment and higher stock prices as their top two 
corporate objectives, whereas Japanese managers rank improving existing 
products or introducing new ones, and increasing market share as their 
two highest priorities.22 Higher stock prices are ranked last by Japanese 
managers among the eight objectives included in the study.
These survey findings are also consistent with evidence from corpora-
tions’ actual operations. Porter found that the share of investment going 
to research and development, intangibles (especially investment in ‘cor-
porate training and human resources’) and plant and equipment is lower 
in the US than in Germany and Japan. In addition, the proportion of total 
research and development expenditures going to long-term projects is 
lower in the US. In the US, 22.6 per cent of total R&D budgets were allo-
cated to such projects, while in Japan and Europe, the figures were 46.8
and 60.5 per cent respectively.23
Related to this, recent studies also find that short-term financial market 
pressures have created formidable obstacles to developing ‘high-perfor-
mance’ work environments, despite the increasingly widespread recogni-
21 James Poterba and Lawrence Summers, ‘Time Horizons of American Firms: 
New Evidence from a Survey of CEOs’, manuscript, Department of Economics, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992.
22 Michael Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, 
Washington, DC 1992.
23 Ibid.
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tion of the long-term gains that are achievable through a more secure and 
less hierarchical workplace. Thus, Appelbaum and Berg report on the 
results of a 1995 survey of senior line and human resource executives at 
mid-sized and large US companies. The survey found that 98 per cent of 
respondents agreed that improving employee performance would signifi-
cantly improve business results while 73 per cent said that their company’s 
most important investment was in people. Still, when asked to rank a 
number of business priorities, the respondents put performance of 
people and investment in people near the end of the list, well below stan-
dard measures of financial performance.24
Considering more direct financial indicators, at least over the 1970s and 
1980s, various studies have found that the real after-tax cost of capital was 
higher in the US than Japan and Germany, and that differences in these 
countries’ financial systems are seen as a major contributing factor. 
McCauley and Zimmer, for example, write that greater integration of 
industry and finance has permitted higher leverage without raising bank-
ruptcy risks equivalently, and also greatly reduced liquidity risks of non-
financial firms. Moreover, the Japanese and German governments are 
more actively involved in mitigating the direct costs associated with non-
financial firms’ periods of financial distress.25
Mergers, Takeovers and Speculation
It is consistent with these general findings that the bank-based systems 
almost fully avoided the corporate mergers, buyouts and takeovers that 
were pervasive within the US and the UK in the 1980s. Indeed, according to 
the work of Michael Jensen, the most influential mainstream analyst of 
the 1980s merger and buyout wave, the phenomenon in the US and the UK
represented precisely an effort to resolve the principal/agent problems 
resulting from the Anglo-American financial system. This effort was 
almost entirely salutary in Jensen’s view.26
Jensen argues that the market for corporate control, and the corporate 
restructurings it has forced, remedies the incentive, coordination and 
informational problems of the Anglo-American corporate form using 
straightforward means: limiting the prerogatives of managers and increas-
ing the control of owners. Managers are forced to face constant threats to 
their power and position, and are therefore much more responsive to 
shareholders’ interests. This view also holds that the substitution of debt 
for equity is a powerful tool for reducing management authority over 
unutilized cash flow because, unlike dividend payments to equity owners, 
managers are legally bonded to distribute interest payments on their debt.
24 Eileen Appelbaum and Peter Berg, ‘Financial Market Constraints and Business 
Strategy in the US’, in J. Michie and J. Grieve Smith, eds, Restoring Full Employment: 
Rebuilding Industrial Capacity, Oxford 1996, forthcoming.
25 Robert N. McCauley and Steven A. Zimmer, ‘Explaining International 
Differences in the Cost of Capital’, New York Federal Reserve Bank Quarterly Review,
summer 1989, pp. 7–28.
26 See for instance, Michael Jensen, ‘The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and 
Evidence’, in J. Coffee Jr., L. Lowenstein and S. Rose-Ackerman, eds, Knight,
Raiders and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover, New York 1988, pp. 314–54.
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Following this perspective, one would expect that the enormous invest-
ment in corporate takeovers in the 1980s would have generated compar-
ably large net benefits to the US and UK economies. While considerable 
controversy exists over evaluating the outcome, a careful survey by Crotty 
and Goldstein of the US experience found that the overall social costs far 
exceeded the benefits:
The evidence is mounting that the costs of creating and allocating 
credit through the deregulated financial markets of the 1980s are 
likely to be significant and persistent. In many cases, employees in 
merged firms suffered a direct loss of security, income and/or jobs. 
The spill overs from these losses have been substantial; communi- 
ties have suffered, and workers’ commitment to productivity 
growth has been badly shaken. Productivity is threatened also by 
the constraining effects of debt on investment and R&D expendi- 
tures. And finally, the financial stability and flexibility of industrial 
and commercial companies and financial institutions throughout 
the economy has been impaired.27
This is not to say that speculative finance is absent in the bank-based 
systems. The 1980s inflation of the Japanese stock market and its crash in 
1989 provide dramatic evidence that volatility there is comparable to that 
in the US and uk.28 But the crucial point is that, because of the close rela-
tionship between financial and non-financial firms in bank-based systems, 
speculative financial behavior does not exert significant influence on real 
economic activity. In Japan itself, for example, controlling blocks of many 
firms’ shares are held among strategic partners within Keiretsu, the bank-
industry clusters. Yet roughly 40 per cent of corporate stock is held by 
non-allied shareholders. This segment of the Japanese market is even 
more engaged in short-term trading than the US market, with the net 
result being that overall trading volume and turnover are very similar in 
the two countries. Goldstein describes the Japanese financial market as 
strongly bifurcated into fluid and dedicated segments, with the latter still 
exercising predominant influence.
5. Economic Policy under Alternative Systems
Broadly speaking, bank-based systems are structured more suitably than 
capital market-based systems for achieving favourable results from two 
primary policy tools—expansionary policy and industrial strategy. The 
basic source of the advantages inherent in bank-based systems is the greater 
integration between non-financial and financial firms, which engenders a 
commonality of purpose that is absent in capital market-based systems.
27 James Crotty and Don Goldstein, ‘Do US Financial Markets Allocate Credit 
Efficiently? The Case of Corporate Restructuring in the 1980s’, in G. Dymski, G.
Epstein and R. Pollin, eds, Transforming the U.S. Financial System: Equity and Efficiency 
for the 21st Century, Armonk, NY 1993, p. 276.
28 Don Goldstein, ‘Financial Structure and Corporate Behavior in Japan and the 
US: Insulation vs. Integration with Speculative Pressures’, manuscript, 
Department of Economics, Allegheny College, 1995.
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Expansionary Macro Policy
In bank-based systems, since banks hold equity positions and are active in 
the management of firms, the banks, along with the non-financial firms, 
will be more favourably disposed toward expansionary macro policies. In 
the Anglo-American system, where financial firms are not directly linked 
to industry, the financial firms are more likely to favour restrictive policies. 
The value of outstanding financial assets are more important to the 
Anglo-American financial firms than the growth prospects of non-finan-
cial firms, and as such, they are more concerned about the threat of infla-
tion than comparable institutions in bank-based systems.29
These attributes are reflected in the central bank policies of different types 
of countries. In the US and UK, the central bank has a relatively high degree 
of independence which over time has evolved into a close alliance with 
financial interests. These banks have therefore tended to favour restrictive 
policies. In the bank-based systems, where there is a strong link between 
bank and industry, biases toward restrictiveness tend to be weaker, though 
Germany, with its combination of a bank-based system and a highly inde-
pendent central bank, is a clear exception to this general tendency.30
Related to this, in the US/UK model, the independence of the financial 
system has led to a strong international orientation for its financial sector. 
In both cases, the domestic currency is used extensively for international 
transactions, and a formidable industry has developed around interna-
tional finance. Maintenance of confidence in the currency is therefore 
given greater priority than in bank-based systems.31 It also appears that 
the negative collateral effects of expansionary policy tend to be stronger 
in the Anglo-American than the bank-based systems, though more 
research is needed to establish this point. The most general problem is 
that expansionary policy in capital market-based systems are more likely 
to engender an allocation of credit toward speculative finance, such as 
mergers, buyouts, and real-estate investments. Again, the bank-based
29 This argument is developed theoretically and empirically in Gerald and Juliet 
Schor, ‘Macropolicy in the Rise and Fall of the Golden Age’, in S. Marglin and J. 
Schor, eds, The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience, New 
York 1990, pp. 126–52.
30 Gerald Epstein ranks the central banks of OECD countries according to their 
degree of independence. (‘A Political Economy Model of Comparative Central 
Banking’, in G. Dymski and R. Pollin, eds, New Perspectives in Monetary 
Macroeconomics:Explorations in the Tradition of Hyman P. Minsky, Ann Arbor, 1994, p.
259.) By his ranking, in the early 1990s, Germany had the most independent bank, 
followed by the US and UK. This situation has been evolving since the time of 
Epstein’s ranking, given that the establishment of independent central banks has 
become a major policy aim within the international banking community, including 
policy makers at the International Monetary Fund and those directing the move-
ment toward a European Monetary Union. As one important measure of this 
change, legislation was enacted in France in 1992 mandating that its central bank 
become independent, and steps toward implementing this policy change have 
been advancing steadily. This development will have important implications for 
the future viability of bank-based systems. Here, however, we are primarily con-
cerned with the lessons to be learned from recent past experiences. 
31 See Fine and Harris, The Peculiarities of the British Economy, pp. 61–2, and Epstein 
and Schor, ‘Macropolicy in the Rise and Fall of the Golden Age’.
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systems have high degrees of speculation as well but at the core of the 
credit market systems are institutional provisions for productive finance.
Financial Markets and Industrial Strategy
The advantage of bank-based systems here is that they are more amenable 
to public credit allocation policies as a central focus of industrial strategy.32
Public credit allocation policies, in turn, are regarded in much of the litera-
ture as an effective instrument of industrial strategy. At the same time, in 
considering the historical experience—particularly that of the US, which 
has pursued extensive public credit policies—the actual causal relation-
ships between a country’s financial structure, its degree of public credit 
allocation, and its efforts and attainments in the area of industrial strategy, 
are not clear-cut. That is, while it may appear that countries with bank-based 
systems are more successful at implementing credit policies and industrial 
strategy, this may primarily result from the fact that the same countries are 
more actively engaged in both credit allocation and industrial strategy.
Relatedly, the historical record is not clear on the extent to which countries 
with capital-market systems can deploy credit policies to compensate for 
the capital market’s distortions—that is, engaging credit policies to repli-
cate the desirable features of a bank-based system within the existing 
capital market institutional framework. We return to these questions in 
section three; as a prelude to that discussion, I now briefly review the expe-
riences of various countries with credit policies and industrial strategies.
Zysman, for one, argues emphatically that public credit allocation policies 
are necessary—indeed are the one essential tool—for successfully imple-
menting industrial strategies. He says there are two reasons for this. The 
first is that:
business decisions are hard to control or influence through admin- 
istrative or regulatory rules. Those same decisions may, however, be 
influenced by negotiation in which the payment for services ren- 
dered is unambiguously calculated in monetary terms. 
Discretionary influence in industrial finance permits the govern-
ment to deal within the framework of business decisions and to 
affect the balance sheet directly.33
In addition, Zysman argues that public credit allocation is a universally 
applicable policy instrument. As such, it ‘eliminates the need to find spe-
cific authority to influence specific decisions or to control an agency that
32 Following Sawyer, I use the term ‘industrial strategy’ rather than ‘industrial 
policy’. Sawyer draws a distinction between a broad notion that government ‘can 
play a positive enabling role in the economy and that institutions . . . can have a 
beneficial influence on the workings of the economy’, associated with ‘industrial 
strategy’; and the narrower the concept of ‘industrial policy’ as equivalent to 
‘competition policy’. Malcolm Sawyer, ‘Industrial Strategy and Employment in 
Europe’, in J. Michie and J. Grieve Smith, eds, Unemployment in Europe, London 
1994, p. 177. Other useful discussions of the meaning of industrial policy are pre-
sented in Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy, and Grahame Thompson, 
‘Grounding Industrial Policy?’, International Review of Applied Economics, vol. 9, no. 
2, (1995) pp. 221–8.
33 Zysman, Government, Markets and Growth, pp. 76–7.
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has formal authority over a specific policy instrument.’ By comparison, 
Zysman contends that tax policy is not nearly as effective a policy tool. 
Taxes tend to operate on gross profits from earnings, and thus are an ex 
post rather than ex ante incentive to pursue the priorities of the industrial 
strategy. Tax policy is also less flexible; it can be reasonably used to target 
categories of activity but not specific industrial ends.34
Despite differences of detail, there appear to be three basic common ele-
ments to public credit allocation policies among the countries that have 
used such policies for financing an industrial strategy. To begin with, the 
national government is the major initial recipient of the economy’s saving 
supply. This is achieved through various mechanisms: in Japan, it is done 
through the postal saving system, in France and Taiwan through the 
public ownership of banks. In South Korea, public bank ownership was 
supplemented by the government running persistent budget surpluses. 
Through all these mechanisms, the state has power to act as the 
economy’s principal financial intermediary.35
From here, the state is then able to utilize the disbursement of credit as a 
policy tool. This can be done either by disbursing to private intermedi-
aries, as is done in the Japanese system, or by the state making direct loans 
to non-financial firms, as is done in France or Korea.36 Finally, powerful 
state agencies—such as MITI in Japan and the Trésor in France—are in a 
position to easily monitor the progress of their industrial strategy via their 
oversight of the return flow of debt servicing by the borrowing units.
Experiences in the US and UK
The US and UK have had divergent experiences with respect to public credit
allocation and industrial strategy. Since the 1930s, the US has had considerable
34 Working with US data, Thomas Karier for example finds that tax credits to stim-
ulate private investment are highly inefficient: only 12 per cent of the credits are 
actually spent on new investment. The other 82 per cent are used to pay higher 
dividends, buy stocks or bonds, or otherwise reduce reliance on external sources 
of funds. Karier, ‘Investment Tax Credit Reconsidered: Business Tax Incentives 
and Investments’, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Public 
Policy Brief, no. 13, 1994. On the other hand, Stiglitz raises concerns about credit 
subsidy programs because the costs are diffuse and difficult to calculate. Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, ‘The Role of the State in Financial Markets’, manuscript, Department of 
Economics, Stanford University, 1993, p. 5.
35 Note that the state collection of private saving also enables the state to provide 
deposit insurance without facing the moral hazard problem—encouraging exces-
sively risky lending practices by private intermediaries carrying government guar-
anteed deposits—that exists with a public deposit insurance/private 
intermediation system such as that in the US. It was precisely this problem in the 
US that was the proximate cause of the Savings and Loan fiasco. See Martin H. 
Wolfson, ‘The Evolution of the Financial System and the Possibilities for 
Reform’, in G. Dymski et al, eds, Transforming the U.S. Financial System, pp. 133–56.
36 Chang discusses how a combination of quantity rationing and interest-rate sub-
sidies were used in South Korea to promote the domestic machinery industry. He 
writes that ‘credits were usually refused to those who wanted to import domesti-
cally available machines, and instead subsidized credits, which sometimes 
amounted to 90 per cent of the product value, were provided to the purchasers of 
domestic machinery.’ Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy, p. 102.
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experience with public credit allocation policies. Indeed, considering all 
forms of credit allocation—direct loans, guaranteed loans and government-
sponsored enterprise loans—the federal government is the largest creditor in 
the US financial market, lending or underwriting on an annual basis between 
about 15–30 per cent of all loans. Major recipients of funds have been the 
housing sector, agriculture and education. These programmes, moreover, 
have achieved considerable success relative to their stated goals. For example, 
they have contributed substantially to the unprecedented access to home 
ownership enjoyed by a high proportion of the non-wealthy in the US.37
The extent and successes of these programmes demonstrate that credit 
policies can be implemented effectively within a capital market-based 
financial system. At the same time, while these policies have been crucial 
to the development of targeted sectors, they have not been used in the US
to guide an overall industrial strategy. It is therefore difficult to gauge the 
extent to which a broader-based set of credit–industrial policies might be 
frustrated by the structure of US financial markets. However, the success 
of these programmes on their own terms suggests, contrary to Zysman, 
that the ability to successfully implement credit allocation policies may 
not depend significantly on whether a country’s financial system operates 
as a bank- or capital market-based system.
As for the UK, the Labour party governments in the 1960s and 1970s did 
attempt to pursue industrial strategies but without using public credit 
allocation policies as part of that effort. The private capital market finan-
cial system thus acted as a barrier to the successful attainment of indus-
trial policy. As Zysman writes:
Despite Labour’s hope of reforming capitalism, the government 
had neither the instruments to do so nor a conception of how to 
manipulate the industrial economy . . . Physical controls, which 
proved unworkable, were seen as the only alternative to a reluctant 
endorsement of the market system. Even nationalization did not 
alter the fundamentally arm’s length relations between government 
and the now-public companies . . .38
6. Objectionable Aspects of Bank-Based Systems
Despite the many successful features of bank-based systems, they also 
have serious deficiencies, in particular from the perspective of construct-
ing an egalitarian economic programme. The close, interlocking relation-
ships between major firms, banks and government bureaucracies create 
opportunities for clientism in credit allocation.39 Even more objection-
37 A basic reference on the development of federal credit programs in the US is 
Barry P. Bosworth, Andrew S. Carron and Elisabeth H. Rhyne, The Economics of 
Federal Credit Programs, Washington DC 1987.
38 Zysman, Government, Markets and Growth, p. 82; see also Fine and Harris, The
Peculiarities of the British Economy, pp. 123–4.
39 Considering the East Asian economies, small- and medium-sized firms were 
clearly discriminated against in their access to subsidized credit. Yet, these firms 
did still benefit from the public credit policies as suppliers to the larger, directly 
subsidized firms. Moreover, in Japan and more recently in South Korea, the 
government also allowed small- and medium-sized firms to take shelter behind 
legislation allowing them to cartelize. See Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, pp. 180–4.
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40 Cox, ‘The State, Finance and Industry Relationship in Comparative 
Perspective’.
able from the perspective of constructing an egalitarian programme is the 
fact that public credit allocation policies have been most successfully 
implemented in countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan where 
government planners were completely independent from democratic 
decision-making processes. In France, as in the East Asian economies, 
government credit policies were independently established within the elite 
Trésor unit of the Treasury but these policies were still subject to some 
democratic pressures within the framework of the French polity. But for 
just this reason, Cox argues that public credit allocation policies in France 
were less successful than those in Japan: that is, the French were forced to 
a far greater degree to use these policies to simply subsidize ailing indus-
trial firms, avoiding the social costs of closing the plants.40 Regardless of 
the accuracy of Cox’s assessment, the point he raises is important. He is 
suggesting that the more the state is a site of political conflict, the greater 
the likelihood that credit allocation policies will become an instrument for 
competing, rent-seeking constituencies. Such observations raise questions 
about the idea that public credit allocation policies can be successfully 
implemented within a democratic framework—much less, as we are pro-
posing, that such policies be the instrument for substantially extending 
democracy and improving economic performance. This is the basic ques-
tion that we consider in the next section.
III. Democratic Finance and Egalitarianism
1. Exit and Voice in Financial Systems
Hirschman’s exit/voice framework is important for this discussion 
because it provides a vehicle for exploring the extent to which financial 
systems can be used to increase equality as well as efficiency. Within this 
framework, the Anglo-American system is one dominated by exit as a 
means of exercising influence. Thus, dissatisfied shareholders or 
bondholders of a firm will typically express displeasure by selling their 
claims to the firm. A voice mechanism is incorporated into the US system 
through its extensive system of public credit allocation but, again, these 
programmes were designed with limited goals in mind and thus the voice 
mechanism is correspondingly limited.
By contrast, the bank-based financial systems are premised on the exer-
cise of influence by voice. Major financial institutions and state agencies 
are actively involved in charting a non-financial firm’s long-term plans and 
then committing themselves to the process of implementing those plans. 
At the same time, as we have noted, the exercise of voice in these 
economies is almost entirely confined to an elite grouping of capitalists, 
political leaders and high-level bureaucrats.
We pursue two specific questions here. The first is how the exercise of 
voice might operate within a democratic institutional framework while 
still retaining the capacity that exists with elite bank-based/voice systems 
to effectively solve incentive, coordination, and informational problems. 
Such a democratic extension of the voice mechanism would necessarily
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depend upon the development of collective organizations seeking to 
influence public credit allocation policies. These, in turn, could provide a 
foundation for building what Cohen and Rodgers call ‘associative democ-
racy,’ that is, the attainment of ‘egalitarian aims by improving the kinds 
and extent of collective organization available to citizens’.41 The second 
question, which we take up in the next section, is whether voice-domi-
nated financial systems could be extended still further in an egalitarian 
direction, specifically to serve, in a manner suggested by Bardhan and 
Roemer, as a foundation for market socialist economies.42
Problems with Exit-Dominated Systems
Hirschman himself discussed the Anglo-American financial model as an 
example of an exit-dominated system, and recognized the costs associ-
ated with such a system. He writes:
When the management of a corporation deteriorates, the first reac-
tion of the best-informed stockholders is to look around for the 
stock of better-managed companies. In thus orienting themselves 
toward exit, rather than voice, investors are said to follow the Wall 
Street rule that ‘if you do not like the management you should sell 
your stock.’ According to a well-known manual this rule ‘results in 
perpetuating bad management and bad policies.’ Naturally it is not 
so much the Wall Street rule that is at fault as the ready availability 
of alternative investment opportunities in the stock market which 
makes any resort to voice rather than to exit unthinkable for any but 
the most committed stockholder.43
To some extent, the merger movement of the 1980s can be interpreted as 
an attempt to overcome the hegemony of the exit option and create a 
vehicle for voice in the Anglo-American financial systems. It was a failed 
attempt, as we have seen, both in its own terms, because its enormous 
costs far exceeded its benefits, but also, more broadly, because of its 
highly constricted conception of which groups deserved to exercise voice 
(shareholders) and which should be excluded (all stakeholders).
Combining Exit and Voice
While Hirschman’s argument points toward the benefits of a strong voice 
option, he also recognizes that the most favourable situation is one that 
achieves an appropriate balance between exit and voice. Reaching such a 
balance, however, is difficult. To begin with, voice can atrophy in situa-
tions when both options are available but exit is highly accessible. 
Consider, for example, an important case in which a voice mechanism was 
injected into the exit-dominated US financial system. This is the experi-
ence since 1977 with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Under the 
terms of the CRA, banks are obliged to provide funds for the communities
41 Joshua Cohen and Joel Rodgers, ‘Associative Democracy’, in P. Bardham and J. 
Roemer, eds, Market Socialism: The Current Debate, New York 1993, p. 236.
42 Bardhan and Roemer, ‘Market Socialism’, pp. 101–16 and Bardhan and Roemer, 
eds, Market Socialism.
43 Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, p. 46.
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in which they operate. However, this regulation exists within a highly 
unfavourable environment. The banks, in dealing with small-scale 
borrowers, generally seek to package standardized loans into marketable 
securities for the national and global market. Almost by definition, loans 
that bring new opportunities to poor communities will tend not to meet 
the conditions of the standardized loans. In addition, local communities 
have no institutional means of monitoring bank compliance with the law. 
Not surprisingly, the CRA has had little impact on bank lending practices.44
It follows that exit options must be limited in order that voice be effective. 
But it is also true that an environment which lacks a credible exit option is 
also not viable. Without the exit option, the sanctions one can threaten 
when expressing dissatisfaction will carry little credibility.45 Considering 
financial markets, the bifurcated Japanese market offers a useful model. 
There, as we have seen, controlling blocks of firms are closely held within 
Keiretsu, who manage their interlocking companies through the exercise 
of voice. At the same time, because roughly 40 per cent of financial assets 
are publicly traded, a viable exit option is provided which also transmits 
the public market’s assessment of a firm’s performance. This also creates 
wide opportunities for speculative finance, but they generally do not 
diminish the ‘financial commitment’ (referring again to Lazonick’s term) 
of the Keiretsu to the long-term operations of a firm.
These observations point toward an important generalization: what is 
crucial in organizing an efficient financial system is not whether the 
system is bank- or capital market-based, but rather, how to attain the 
appropriate mix of voice and exit. We observe that a strong voice option 
is needed to resolve the incentive, coordination, and informational prob-
lems in a financial system in a way that encourages long time horizons and 
financial stability. But a viable exit option must also exist to at least lend 
weight to dissatisfied voices. Posing the issue this way allows for greater 
flexibility—and even optimism—in addressing policy issues. The initial 
policy problem is not to anoint one system (bank-based) while rejecting 
the other (capital market-based), for both have evolved in various coun-
tries over long periods of history and are unlikely to be displaced in toto. 
The actual challenge appears rather more manageable: how, within given 
existing institutional environments, can voice be strengthened sufficiently 
without smothering exit.
2. Political Power and the Exercise of Voice
Of course, giving priority to voice over exit does not at all address the 
issue of whose voice is being empowered. In existing bank-based systems, 
as we have discussed, the extension of the voice option is quite limited. 
Can voice-dominant financial systems be viable when the voice option is 
substantially extended?
44 For a discussion of the Community Reinvestment Act, see James T. Campen, 
‘Banks, Communities and Public Policy’, in G. Dymski et al, eds, Transforming the 
US Financial System, pp. 221–52.
45 Such, for example, was the case in the former Soviet economy. One important 
reason adequate quality controls did not exist was that consumers could never 
threaten to take their business elsewhere.
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In considering this question, it will be useful to consider a formulation by 
Edward Banfield to which Hirschman refers: ‘The effort an interested 
party makes to put its case before the decision maker will be in proportion 
to the advantage to be gained from a favourable outcome multiplied by 
the probability of influencing the decision’.46 Drawing from this frame-
work, the challenge can be defined as developing institutions through 
which there is both advantage to be gained from exercising voice and a 
good probability that advantage will be so gained. In capitalist societies, of 
course, the wealthy have far greater means to organize effective voice 
mechanisms. Indeed, a legitimate criticism of efforts to extend the voice 
option is that this will merely generate new vehicles for rent-seeking—and 
attaining—by the wealthy. This is why means to strengthen associative 
democracy are crucial components of strengthening the voice option, 
especially, as Cohen and Rodgers write, ‘efforts to promote the organized 
representation of excluded interests’.47 How can this be done within 
financial systems?
A dramatic intervention in this direction would be to nationalize a sub-
stantial proportion of a country’s financial institutions. We put aside 
whether such a strategy is politically feasible. However, an even more 
basic concern is whether a nationalization strategy, on its own, is likely to 
change the structure of a country’s financial institutions in any significant 
way, and specifically whether it is likely to promote the extension of voice.
The French experience is instructive. Roughly half of the French banking 
system has been nationalized since the 1940s and the Mitterand govern-
ment nationalized another 30 per cent after coming to power in 1981.
Nevertheless, as Lipietz, among others, has written, the financial system 
operated in a manner essentially indistinguishable from private banks, 
both before and after 1981.48 Moreover, the Mitterand government’s deci-
sion to nationalize was never linked to a broader strategy of financial 
market democratization or even experimentation. Quite the contrary: the 
government’s first major policy decision was to defend financial ortho-
doxy with respect to the exchange rate, a position it consistently main-
tained thereafter.49
A nationalization policy thus begs the question of how to promote a 
democratic voice within financial institutions. More to the point are a 
range of proposals that have been developed recently which, given exist-
ing property relations, focus on specific methods of extending the voice 
mechanism. For illustration, I will cite some that have been developed pri-
marily within the US context, but the basic approach is generalizable
46 Edward Banfield, Political Influence, New York 1961; cited in Hirschman, Exit,
Voice and Loyalty, p. 39.
47 Cohen and Rodgers, ‘Associative Democracy’, p. 238.
48 Alain Lipietz, ‘The Limits of Bank Nationalization in France’, in L. Harris, J. 
Coakley, M. Croasdale, and T. Evans, eds, New Perspectives on the Financial System,
New York 1988, pp. 389–402.
49 See Serge Halmi, Jonathan Michie and Seumas Milne, ‘The Mitterand 
Experience’, in J. Michie and J. Grieve Smith, eds, Unemployment in Europe, London 
1994, pp. 97–115, for a discussion of the development of the Socialists’ thinking 
on this issue from their campaign platform through the early period of the 
Mitterand government.
beyond this one case. I consider these proposals in terms of both of 
Banfield’s criteria for evaluating voice mechanisms: whether they provide 
means of increasing the probability of influencing decisions and whether 
they increase the advantages to be gained from favourable decisions.
3. Influencing Decisions Through Democratic Voice
Beginning in the area of corporate governance, Block has developed a 
fairly specific proposal for dramatically changing the relevant legal struc-
ture. He suggests that the boards of directors of public corporations 
consist of, for example, 35 per cent employers, 35 per cent asset holders, 
and 30 per cent others, perhaps including consumers or community repre-
sentatives. This proposal, as Block points out, would ‘initially leave much of 
the corporation’s day-to-day operations unchanged’.50 Firms would still 
have to sell products in competitive markets, and would rely on labour 
markets in supplying workers. Given the new governance structure, the 
relationship that the firm has with these markets would undoubtedly evolve 
over time. Nevertheless, how it does so would remain flexible: Block makes 
no assumptions as to how operations would be affected by the democratic 
governance structure. The only certainty is that creating the democratic- 
voice mechanism would separate the firm’s decision making from the influ-
ence of the wealthy, in particular, the firms’ largest shareholders.
Considering workers’ pension funds—the largest saving vehicle in the US, 
incorporating one-third of the economy’s financial assets—Barber and 
Ghilarducci take an approach similar to that of Block.51 They propose 
that the authority of fund participants themselves over the funds’ invest-
ment decisions be increased substantially. This would be achieved by 
mandating elected participant representation on corporate pension-fund 
boards. Under current practice, pension-fund managers and government 
regulators almost always interpret existing regulations in the most restric-
tive way, and thereby treat their fiduciary responsibility as equivalent to 
that for incompetent heirs. That is, all authority rests with the managers, 
none with the fund participants. Barber and Ghilarducci argue that signif-
icant steps toward more democratic practices could be implemented even 
under existing laws.
A variety of proposals have also been advanced to bring greater account-
ability to the Federal Reserve system, and thereby weaken its inde-
pendence from democratic political pressures. One proposal is to institute 
direct elections of the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks 
in each bank region. At present, the regional bank boards are selected by 
officers of private member banks of the system and by the Governors of 
the system in Washington.52
5° Fred Block, ‘Capitalism Without Class Power’, Politics and Society, 20, 1992, p. 289.
51 Randy Barber and Teresa Ghilarducci, ‘Pension Funds, Capital Markets, and the
Economic Future’, in G. Dymski et al, eds, Transforming the US Financial System, pp.
287–320.
52 A range of proposals is discussed in Dymski et al, eds, Transforming the US
Financial System. The proposal to directly elect Directors of Federal Reserve Banks
is developed in Pollin, ‘Public Credit Allocation through the Federal Reserve: Why
it is Needed; How it Should Be Done’, in G. Dymski et al, eds, Transforming the US
Financial System, pp. 321–54.
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4. Gaining Advantage Through Democratic Voice
However useful on their own terms, none of these proposals to increase 
democratic-voice mechanisms directly address Banfield’s criteria of 
increasing the advantages to be gained by favourable outcomes. In coun-
tries that already have extensive public credit allocation systems or, as 
with Germany, a voice-dominated private system, democratizing these 
existing voice mechanisms may itself bring more favourable outcomes. 
However, within private capital market-based systems such as the US and 
UK, such democratic interventions would have little impact unless a broad 
system of public credit allocation was concurrently introduced.
The standard ‘market failure’ justification for the public credit policies 
flows from the substantial divergence between the social as opposed to 
the private costs and benefits of many types of lending flows.53 Thus, for 
example, the effects on employment and community development of 
loans to finance low-income housing will be quite different than loans to 
finance corporate takeovers. But the benefits of the low-income housing 
loan will not accrue solely, or perhaps even primarily, to the investor 
undertaking the project or the bank but will be spread widely throughout 
a community. In such cases, a public authority, representing the larger 
community, will need to subsidize the housing loan over the takeover 
loan. A literature which considers many of the practical issues in pursuing 
such public credit policies has developed in recent years. Let us briefly 
consider some of these discussions in the areas of pension-fund invest-
ing, as well as, more broadly, regulatory, monetary and fiscal policy.
Pension Funds
A fairly extensive literature has developed which recognizes that, in prin-
ciple, a case for incorporating social costs and benefits of pension-fund 
investing flows readily from the fact that fund participants—as workers 
tied to specific communities—are likely to be the beneficiaries of the 
spill-over employment and community effects of these investments.54 At 
the same time, such efforts also face serious pitfalls. The basic problem is 
that the full social benefits of a given pension-fund investment are not 
likely to be captured by the participants of a given fund. Other communi-
ties and workers will also likely enjoy benefits, but without having to 
shoulder any of the corresponding costs. As a result, for the pension-fund 
participants themselves, the fund earns a lower rate of return than they 
would have through following orthodox investment criteria. Since the 
1970s in the US, many instances have been cited where the funds did 
indeed earn a lower return or incurred higher risks in supporting invest-
ments whose social benefits were diffuse.
These criticisms must, however, be seen within a broader context. First, 
pension funds managed according to the standards of orthodox finance
53 A much more extensive set of criteria for such interventions, and for state inter-
ventions more broadly, are discussed in Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial 
Policy.
54 This discussion follows the survey of the literature in Barber and Ghilarducci, 
‘Pension Funds, Capital Markets, and the Economic Future’.
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have themselves performed quite poorly in the 1980s as financial markets 
became increasingly speculative. According to one study, pension funds 
earned on average 2.6 per cent less than the average of the Standard and 
Poor’s 500 index, and this before subtracting management fees that aver-
aged 0.5 per cent of assets. Such a performance suggests that the funds 
should simply fire their managers and purchase an index fund such as that 
for the Standard and Poor’s 500. The problem here is that in so doing, the 
fund participants, far from increasing their control over the allocation of 
their own pensions, would then have completely surrendered their 
authority to the vagaries of the market.
The alternative would be to use policy to create market conditions sup-
portive of social investment criteria. Barber and Ghilarducci point out 
that, as experience has been gained and when governments have been 
supportive, many efforts at social investing of pension funds have been 
successful. To solidify these successes, and to advance similar initiatives 
toward the construction of a democratic voice-led financial structure, 
broader supportive measures will be needed in the areas of regulatory, 
central bank and fiscal policy.55
Financial Regulation
Let us consider again the Community Reinvestment Act, as it is one 
recent regulatory initiative in the US in which something akin to a democ-
ratic-voice agenda has at least been put into law, if not practice. One 
major problem with the CRA is that it applies only to banks. The banks 
legitimately claim that they are placed at a competitive disadvantage rela-
tive to other intermediaries. This disadvantage is then used as one argu-
ment for not enforcing the law. A simple but dramatic means of 
strengthening the CRA would thus be to extend its requirements to all 
intermediaries—to ‘level the playing field upward’ for all financial institu-
tions.56 As proposed by D’Arista and Schlesinger, such an upward leveling 
of regulatory requirements could be accomplished fairly readily. The 
primary legal change would entail a uniform licensing system for all inter-
55 Contrasting perspectives on the viability of comparable strategies in the UK are 
given by Robin Murray, ‘Pension Funds and Local Authority Investment’, in L. 
Harris, J. Coakley, M. Croasdale, and T. Evans, eds, New Perspectives on the Financial 
System, New York 1988, pp. 306–24, and Richard Minns, ‘Pension Funds: An 
Alternative View’, in Harris et al, eds, New Perspectives on the Financial System, pp.
325–44. The experience in Sweden since 1976 with the wage-earner fund pro-
posed by the union economist Rudolph Meidner also offers interesting per-
spectives on the progressive management of pension funds. However, Meidner’s 
plan was an effort to extend worker ownership and control over the operations of 
the firm (paralleling the Block proposal in this latter aspect), in addition to influ-
encing the broader composition of investment, the primary concern of social 
investment strategies in the US. For discussion of the political issues aroused by 
Meidner’s proposal, see Jonas Pontusson, ‘Sweden: After the Golden Age’, in 
Anderson and Camiller, Mapping the West European Left, pp. 23–54.
56 The proposal to ‘level the playing field upward’ for all financial institutions is 
presented in Jane W. D’Arista and Tom Schlesinger, ‘The Parallel Banking System’, 
in G. Dymski et al, eds, Transforming the U.S. Financial System, pp. 157–200. Further 
background on the evolution of the financial regulatory structure is presented in 
D’Arista’s extensive and important study, The Evolution of US Finance, vol. II,
Armonk, NY 1994.
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mediaries, which would include all institutions that accept deposits from 
the public and make loans or purchase equity with those funds. All such 
institutions would then be required to maintain some form of a ‘commu-
nity investment’ portfolio.57
Such a change would also clearly require a revision of the notion of a 
‘community portfolio’: the proposal would obviously not aim to have 
‘communities’ already favoured with heavy concentrations of financial 
institutions, such as Wall Street, showered with new lending opportunities 
while areas with few financial institutions are starved for funds. In 
keeping with the spirit of the CRA, the principle underlying its broadening
would have to be that financial institutions must take into account the 
social spillover effects of their loan portfolio in order to comply with the 
terms of their charters. Implementing this idea on a broad scale could 
perhaps be best accomplished within the framework of central bank 
policy.
Central Bank Policy
With respect to the Federal Reserve, fairly simple measures could go far to 
support social criteria for credit allocation and investment, and thereby 
also complement policies to extend democratic accountability within the 
central bank. At present, the Fed operates though two basic policy instru-
ments: open-market operations, which is the buying and selling of 
government securities in ‘the open market’ to change short-term interest 
rates; and ‘discount-window policy’ through which the regional Federal 
Reserve banks make loans directly to banks seeking additional cash 
reserves. Both policy instruments are exclusively concerned with short-
run movements of interest rates and credit aggregates. And yet, as a result 
of the experiences over the past twenty years with financial innovation, 
deregulation and globalization, the Federal Reserve’s ability to achieve 
even their short-term policy aims has diminished.58
At the same time, I have argued elsewhere that two relatively simple policy 
innovations could substantially increase the central bank’s ability to influ-
ence longer-term credit allocation patterns, including policies targeted at 
social-lending criteria.59 The first policy change would be to increase the 
role of discount-window lending relative to open market operations. This 
will give the regional Federal Reserve Banks, each of which operates its 
own discount window, more direct regulatory authority over the lending 
activities of private intermediaries, enabling them to promote longer time 
horizons and financial stability, as well as a set of social-lending criteria 
flowing from, for example, a targeted pension-fund investment strategy. It 
will also redistribute Federal Reserve decision-making power downward, 
creating more effective channels for accountability. The second sugges-
tion is to establish differential asset–reserve requirements for all US inter-
mediaries. Preferred uses of credit, established by the calculation of social 
57 D’Arista and Schlesinger, ‘The Parallel Banking System’.
58 On the limited capacity of standard monetary policy tools to achieve their goals 
see, for example, Benjamin Friedman, ‘Lessons of Monetary Policy from the 
1980s’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 3, 1988, pp. 51–72.
59 Pollin, ‘Public Credit Allocation through the Federal Reserve’.
costs and benefits of loans, would then become significantly less costly 
than non-preferred uses of funds. This subsidy for socially desirable loans 
would then be one simple way to generalize the social-lending criteria 
embodied in an expanded Community Reinvestment Act or a targeted 
pension-fund investment strategy.
Securities Transaction Tax
The aim of such a tax would be to reduce speculative financial activity by 
raising the costs of trading financial assets. This would be done by sub-
jecting all financial asset trades to a small tax. The tax rate would be low 
enough that it would be negligible in cases where assets were purchased 
and held for lengthy periods. The burden of the tax would only be felt 
among those who are frequent traders.
One of the advantages of this proposal is that, even if it failed to sig-
nificantly reduce speculative trading, it would become a formidable 
source of government revenue, which could in turn finance, for 
example, a public investment programme. Baker, Pollin and Schaberg 
estimate that, given the level of trading in the current US securities 
markets, a tax of 0.5 per cent on equities which was then scaled down 
appropriately for all bonds and derivative instruments, would raise 
roughly $30 billion a year in revenue, even if trading volume fell by one-
half.60
Such taxes have operated in many countries, including France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Japan. In recent years, however, they have been 
largely abandoned, in response to two arguments: that financial markets 
have become too complex to enable the tax to be imposed equitably 
across the various markets; and that global financial integration forces 
countries to minimize taxes, and other costs, to potential investors or 
else lose those funds to countries with lower taxes. However, neither of 
these considerations present insurmountable barriers to designing a 
workable tax. As noted above, the 0.5 per cent tax rate on equities would 
not be applied uniformly to all markets, but would rather be scaled 
downward in the bond and derivative markets according to the maturity 
of various instruments. To discourage investors from leaving the US
market, the tax should be levied on all trades made by US taxpayers, 
regardless of the country in which the trade occurred, just as income tax 
is levied on all income, not just that earned in the US. Such a tax would 
of course operate more effectively in conjunction with a similar tax, as 
proposed by James Tobin, on foreign exchange trading in which all 
countries cooperate.61 However, experiences with purely domestic ver-
sions of the tax make clear that they can function effectively within this 
more narrow context, especially in a country such as the US with a deep 
market for domestic securities.
6o Dean Baker, Robert Pollin and Marc Schaberg, ‘Main Street vs. Wall Street:
Taxing the Big Casino’, The Nation, 9 May 1994, pp. 622–4.
61 David Felix develops the basic arguments on behalf of the ‘Tobin’ foreign 
exchange trading tax, including the position that its revenues be directed at financ-
ing the United Nations. ‘The Tobin Tax Proposal: Background, Issues, and 
Prospects’, Futures, vol. 27, no. 2 (1995), pp. 195–208.
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Are These Proposals Utopian?
The specific policy ideas sketched here are drawn entirely from pro-
grammes that have been used, or at least seriously considered, in the US or 
other advanced capitalist economies. Considered in technical terms, they 
are therefore feasible in that they do not represent a serious departure 
from existing institutional or policy arrangements. They are also adaptable 
to the existing political realities in a country, in that they could be imple-
mented in stages, beginning with the institutional configuration already in 
place.
At the same time, considered as a whole, there is no doubt that such 
extensions of democratic voice would entail a substantial downward shift 
in economic power, and would therefore be resisted by the political and 
economic elite. In particular, one would expect elite groups to persistently 
seek to undermine the effectiveness of any such policies once they were 
enacted into law, as has been done in the US with the Community 
Reinvestment Act. This raises the issue posed by Coakley and Harris for 
the UK and Lipietz for France: whether public ownership of financial 
institutions remains an imperative, not as an end in itself, but as the means 
of implementing the types of egalitarian reforms outlined here.62 We will 
once again leave aside the political dimensions of that question, though 
they are obviously of fundamental importance, and turn instead to the 
implied economic issue: how a voice-dominated financial system would 
operate under public ownership.
IV. Public Ownership and Credit Policies
i. The Bardan/Roemer Model of Market Socialism
Bardhan and Roemer have argued that what I am calling a voice-led 
public credit allocation system can be used as the central organizing 
institution for a workable market socialist economy.63 Their proposal 
incorporates levels of public ownership beyond that of the financial 
sector to include large-scale non-financial enterprises as well. But the 
general thrust of their proposal brings into focus issues relevant for 
various types of nationalization strategies. More generally, as I discuss 
below, their approach can be viewed as one strategy within a range of 
alternatives for developing a framework of democratic voice in financial 
systems.
Bardhan and Roemer argue that a market socialist economy is one in 
which the economy’s large-scale productive assets are publicly owned in 
some fashion. The profits from these enterprises are distributed equally 
among the public. The fundamental challenge for such an economy is the 
same as that which was never successfully resolved in the former 
Communist economies: how to resolve the principal–agent problem 
between managers as agents and the widely dispersed firm owners—the
state and ultimately the citizenry—as principals.
62 Jerry Coakley and Laurence Harris, The City of Capital: London’s Role as a Financial 
Centre, Oxford 1983; Lipietz, ‘The Limits of Bank Nationalization in France’.
63 Bardhan and Roemer, ‘Market Socialism’.
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Since Bardhan and Roemer view this problem as equivalent to that between 
owners and managers in corporate capitalism, they argue that its most effi-
cient resolution will emulate the successful resolutions that have occurred 
in capitalist economies—through a set of voice-led financial institutions 
with a competitive managerial labour market and clear standards for man-
agerial success. They further argue that resolving the system’s incentive 
problems will establish strong safeguards against what Kornai has termed 
‘soft budget constraints’—the means through which governments will 
deviate from established budgetary, tax and pricing policies to bail out inef-
ficient firms rather than allow them to fail.64 Bardhan and Roemer devote 
less attention to the ways in which voice-led financial systems might also 
effectively resolve macroeconomic coordination and information prob-
lems though, as I discuss below, these advantages of a voice-led system 
should also be transferrable to economies dominated by public ownership.
Bardhan and Roemer have outlined a set of financial institutions which 
draw heavily from the Japanese Keiretsu system and other existing voice-
dominated systems. For example, in their model that is most closely akin to 
a Keiretsu system, firms are organized as joint-stock companies—owned 
by their workers, other public companies within their group and the main 
investment bank which finances the group and oversees its activities. There 
could also be other subsidiary owners, including pension funds and insur-
ance companies. The state would be the major owner of the banks, pension 
funds, and insurance companies. In this case there would be several moni-
tors of the firm’s activities: the worker-owners, the workers and managers 
of the other firms in the same industrial group, the managers of the 
pension funds and insurance companies, and most importantly, the manag-
ers of the main bank. As the primary suppliers of funds for the non-finan-
cial firms, the bank managers would have responsibility for financing the 
individual group and maintaining its level of performance. In particular, 
the shares of the large firms can be sold to the main bank. The main bank 
will therefore receive information on firm performance based on their own 
evaluations as well as those of other institutions.
The primary source of external finance in this arrangement would be the 
banks which are themselves publicly owned. Funds could thus be readily 
channeled from the state, via the public banks, to the firms. How then 
could these systems avoid the problem of soft budget constraints? 
Bardhan and Roemer point to three main safeguards. The most important 
is the incentive system for managers. Bank managers who are forced to 
plead with the state for bail-out funds will damage their reputation in the 
process. Moreover, the state would have to make credible pre-commit-
ments to performance standards, and be prepared to liquidate businesses 
which fail to meet them. Finally, the economy would be open to interna-
tional competition.65 This will create an external source of accountability 
for the firms and the system as a whole.
64 See for instance Janos Kornai, ‘Market Socialism Revisited’, in Bardham and 
Roemer, Market, Socialism, pp. 42–68.
65 Though Bardhan and Roemer are not clear on this point, opening an economy 
to international competition should not be interpreted to imply an endorsement 
of unfettered free trade. Considering an extreme example, we would not expect an 
economy operating under socialist precepts to open its markets to goods pro-
duced by prison labour.
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2. Exit/Voice Finance and Alternative Property Relations
The Bardhan/Roemer proposals are essentially a means of stretching the 
egalitarian possibilities of voice-dominated financial systems by combin-
ing the democratic features of a voice system with an egalitarian redistri-
bution of property rights. The relationship between this proposal and the 
others we have surveyed is summarized in the Table (p. 61). The rows of 
the matrix characterize the three types of financial systems: exit-domi-
nated, elite voice-dominated, and democratic-voice systems. The columns 
characterize predominant property arrangements—private, mixed, and 
public. Various historical and existing systems are situated along the first 
two rows. The proposals we have discussed are along the bottom row, 
since all include a democratic-voice mechanism, but are distinguished by 
their predominant system of property ownership.
It becomes clear from this figure that the one change for which there is no 
equivalent experience is the movement down the table toward a democra-
tic-voice mechanism. This raises the question of whether the successes of 
the elite-voice systems are transferable to democratic-voice systems. At 
the same time, the proposals represented in the cell which combines 
democratic voice with predominantly private ownership are designed to 
be implemented incrementally as a reformist programme within the exist-
ing exit- and elite voice-led capitalist systems located in the upper cells of 
the matrix. Movements toward the Bardhan/Roemer proposals would 
entail a more substantial transformation relative to the existing capitalist 
economies, though not necessarily to the former Soviet-type economies. 
In any case, such movements pose the additional issue of whether com-
bining democratic voice with public ownership would further erode the 
benefits of the elite-voice systems. These are the issues to which we now 
turn.
3. Democratic Finance, Public Ownership and Critique of Market
Socialism
The question of whether democratic financial systems can retain the effi-
ciency features of the elite-dominated voice systems can be evaluated 
within a broader and more venerable debate: whether a market economy’s 
sources of efficiency can be replicated within any egalitarian economic 
arrangement. This question has received considerable attention within 
debates over the viability of market socialism. Oscar Lange was of course 
the first to offer a model showing that a market socialist economy could 
function efficiently. He demonstrated that in an economy with free con-
sumer choice, but where the means of production are publicly owned, the 
price mechanism could still be deployed for solving the informational 
problems associated with price formation and resource allocation.66
Lange was attacked by Hayek, who held that his model, while internally 
consistent, nevertheless overlooked the fundamental source of capital-
ism’s efficiency. This was not its ability to allocate resources through com-
petitive price formation, but rather the nature of its property rights
66 Oscar Lange, ‘On The Economic Theory of Socialism’ (1936), in B. Lippincott 
ed., On the Economic Theory of Socialism, Minneapolis 1956.
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system. In particular, Hayek held that the system of private property 
encourages technical progress which, in turn, was the source of capital-
ism’s dynamism.67 It has been recently argued, moreover, most carefully 
by Howard and King, that this Hayekian critique of market socialism in 
fact parallels Marx’s own understanding of the sources of capitalism’s 
dynamism. Howard and King write that:
Disregarding the difference in language, Marx and Hayek are in 
agreement on two fundamental matters concerning the nature of 
capitalist social relations. First the strength of capitalism lies in its 
dynamic transformative power, not its ability to engender alloca- 
tions which satisfy static utilitarian welfare criteria. Second, capital- 
ism is especially effective in raising productivity.68
From this perspective, capitalism engenders efficiency because its system 
of property relations provides freedom to capitalists to develop new 
methods of production and discard existing techniques, and, similarly, to 
deploy and discard employees as needed. Moreover, the system provides a 
powerful incentive structure for capitalists, by holding out formidable 
material rewards for those who succeed in raising productivity through 
innovation, and severe punishments for those who fail.
For Howard and King, it is clear that a market socialist economy cannot 
allow private individuals this degree of freedom in choosing methods of 
production and especially in hiring and firing workers. It cannot therefore 
replicate the basic source of capitalism’s efficiency, and will thus 
inevitably be out-competed by an economy with capitalist private prop-
erty relations. Howard and King argue that if market socialist economies 
were able to compete with capitalist economies in terms of innovation 
and productivity, then they should have been emerging embryonically 
within contemporary capitalism.
4. How Would a Democratic-Voice System Fare?
Clearly, the types of concerns raised by Howard and King and the related 
critical literature on market socialism apply most directly to the 
Bardhan/Roemer version of a democratic-voice financial system, since 
theirs is explicitly a model of market socialism dominated by public own-
ership. Nevertheless, the general issues relating to the sources of capital-
ist efficiency are crucial to all versions of a democratic-voice dominated 
financial system. The departure point of the various democratic financial 
arrangements is that they are not relying on the market as a mere com-
puter analogue (as Patnaik uses the term),69 guiding price formation and 
resource allocation. Rather, they are centered around a set of institutional 
relationships for solving the incentive, coordination and informational 
problems that result within large-scale enterprises and, more broadly, 
within modern economies at the macro level, regardless of the property
67 F.A. Hayek, ‘Socialist Calculation: The Competitive “Solution”’, Economica, 7,
1940, pp. 125–49, and The Fatal Conceit, Chicago 1988. 
68 Michael Howard and John E. King, ‘Is Socialism Feasible? An Analysis in Terms 
of Historical Materialism’, Review of Political Economy, vol. 6, no. 2, (1994) p. 143.
69 Prabhat Patnaik, Economics and Egalitarianism, New Dehli 1991.
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forms around which these economies are organized. As such, these voice-
dominated systems are able to transcend the criticisms of Lange-type 
market socialist schemes.70
First, as we have seen, the existing elite-voice-dominated financial
systems are more efficient than the exit systems in promoting long-
term productivity growth, and—focusing primarily now at the macro 
level which Bardhan and Roemer did not address—in supporting pro-
ductive investment, reducing financial fragility and mitigating the 
effects of speculation. That is, elite-voice-led systems do indeed out-
perform the exit-led systems according to Howard and King’s yardstick 
of productivity and innovation.71 In addition, because voice-dominated 
systems have functioned well in various institutional settings, it is fair 
to say that they have met Howard and King’s more stringent test: they 
have emerged within the interstices of capitalism, and have survived 
and grown precisely because they outperform exit-dominated financial 
systems. It is true that part of the basis for their success has been the 
willingness of the elite class to pursue longer-term ‘organizational 
capabilities’ strategies to high performance, thereby foregoing a 
shorter-term route to rewards through following financial market indi-
cators. This suggests that if the elite classes perceived the short-term 
gains of a financial market strategy were rising significantly in relative 
terms, it may become increasingly difficult to maintain an elite consen-
sus around a voice system. On the other hand, were the elite-voice 
systems to be substantially democratized, one of the premises behind 
such a transformation would have to be to create a new political coali-
tion committed to nurturing the long-term advantages of a voice
model.
Could a democratic-voice model function without relying upon 
unemployment and allied punishments as sources of efficiency? 
Several points are relevant here. First, to the extent that the purpose 
of unemployment is to preserve the capitalists relative bargaining 
70 Working through a critique of the Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium, 
such an argument can also be derived from Stiglitz’s recent book on market social-
ism (Joseph E. Stiglitz, Whither Socialism? Cambridge, Mass. 1994), as is made clear 
in Roemer’s review of this work. John E. Roemer, ‘An Anti-Hayekian Manifesto’, 
NLR, 211, pp. 112–29.
71 There is no presumption here as to which route to high productivity is more 
appropriate for either a technological leader or follower, though it is true that 
historically, voice-led systems have been associated with late developers, such as 
Germany, Japan, and South Korea, while the exit-led systems, the US and the UK, 
began as technological leaders. In The Political Economy of Industrial Policy, espe-
cially chapter 3, Chang gives several reasons why a state-led industrial policy can 
be at least as effective in promoting endogenous technical innovation and long-
term dynamic efficiencies. Perhaps a more fundamental issue here is that the dis-
cussion assumes that productivity gains, without reference to the composition of 
output, are themselves necessarily desirable. While this is not the case, there is 
little doubt that what Edward Nell terms a ‘transformational growth path’—that 
is a change in output composition that incorporates the environmental effects of 
production on social rates of return—is desirable, and that the means to attain-
ing that will entail sustaining both relatively high levels and an efficient allocation 
of investment resources. Nell, Transformational Growth and Effective Demand,
London 1992.
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power in labour markets, any significant extension of public owner-
ship and democratic-voice should reduce that source of pressure for 
unemployment. Second, to the extent that unemployment is associated 
with macroeconomic fluctuations independent of labour market 
imperatives, we have seen that the voice-dominated financial systems 
perform better at maintaining a stable macro environment. Operating 
with a more stable macro economy, the voice-led economies are then 
better able to effectively utilize the traditional tools of fiscal and 
monetary policy.
Could the democratic-voice systems also maintain the set of micro-
incentives available to an elite-voice system? Bardhan and Roemer 
suggest that they could, as long as the economy is open to international 
competition, the government is committed to maintaining clear per-
formance standards and hard budget constraints, and, most importantly, 
there exists a competitive managerial labour market. However 
Putterman, and Roland and Sekkat contend that the managerial labour 
market will not be efficient within a Bardhan/Roemer type public own-
ership framework, and their points raise concerns about all democratic-
voice systems.72
The first argument, emphasized by Putterman, is that citizens in general 
are too diffuse a group as owners. They will have neither adequate 
information nor the motivation to serve as effective monitors of manage-
rial performance. While this is a serious concern, it is once again the same 
problem that exists within a private capital market system. Putterman 
cites the Jensen-type solution to this problem within a capital market 
system, that is, the monitoring that occurs via the market for corporate 
control. But as we have seen, the more efficient and potentially more 
egalitarian solution is a voice-dominated financial system. Moreover, 
encouraging strong citizen associations within the voice-dominated 
system will increase the effectiveness with which citizens monitor man-
agerial performance.
The second concern, stressed by Roland and Sekkat, is that any system 
dominated by public ownership will have foreclosed the exit option for 
managers dissatisfied with a career in the public sector. Predominant 
public ownership will put the state in the position of a monopsonist 
relative to the managerial labour market, giving the government ‘hold-
up’ power over the careers of managers. This is a strong argument, but 
it applies fully only to a system with complete public ownership. What 
their position points toward is the relative merits of arrangements 
somewhere in the middle cell of the last row of Table 1–-that is, a 
democratic-voice dominated system with both public and private own-
ership of corporations. This is likely to provide both a favourable 
environment for innovations in voice-dominated finance while also pre-
venting the state from becoming a monopsonist in the managerial 
labour market.
72 Louis Putterman, ‘Incentive Problems Favoring Noncentralized Investment 
Fund Ownership’, Bardham and Roemer, Market Socialism, pp. 156–68. Gerard 
Roland and Khalid Sekkat, ‘Market Socialism and the Managerial Labor Market’, 
in Bardham and Roemer, Market Socialism, pp. 204–18.
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V. Conclusion
Democratic-voice-led financial systems offer a highly promising founda-
tion on which to reconstruct an egalitarian economic policy agenda. Such
an approach, first of all, is premised on what Patnaik argues is the funda-
mental requirement for an egalitarian economy, ‘the creation of appropri-
ate institutions for the active participation of the working class in 
economic and political life’.73 In addition, this approach is highly flexible. 
It can be developed on the basis of existing institutional arrangements 
within capitalist economies, and thus, depending on political circum-
stances, can be implemented in varying increments on the foundation of 
the existing institutions. Moreover, this policy apparatus can be effectively 
adapted to diverse property ownership systems, ranging from private-
ownership economies such as the contemporary US to predominantly 
public-ownership systems such as still exist in most of Eastern Europe or 
as envisaged by Bardhan and Roemer.
Of course, capitalists and their political allies will resist any serious 
encroachments on their prerogatives in financial markets. Democratic-
voice systems will not be implemented on the basis of their compelling 
logic alone. This is why we have pursued Coakley and Harris’s suggestion 
that public ownership of major financial institutions may be necessary, 
not as an end in itself, but as the basis for implementing effective democ-
ratic credit policies. Even so, in countries such as the US where public 
ownership of the financial system is not politically feasible, important ele-
ments of a democratic-voice agenda are still possible. Programmes such 
as community reinvestment, the targeting of pension-fund investments, 
and changing both the operating goals and degree of accountability of 
the central bank are politically feasible even within the existing US
economy and should be primary concerns of progressive movements. In 
addition, by working to build such policy initiatives within private finan-
cial systems, we gain experience and understanding about the limits of 
reform under private financial systems.
The key to the viability of the democratic-voice approach is that it is able 
to build upon the solution of elite voice-dominated financial systems to 
the incentive, coordination and information problems existing in all 
economies. We saw that the elite voice/bank-based model operates more 
efficiently than exit-based systems in promoting compatible goals 
between owners and managers of firms. These features of the elite-voice 
model should be transferrable to democratic-voice systems.
Much, if not most, economic activity within any version of the democra-
tic-voice model would still be conducted through markets. However, the 
democratic-voice model is not vulnerable to the legitimate critique of the 
Langeian market socialist model, that such a model employs markets as a 
mere computer analogue, neglecting the social relationships underlying 
them. At the same time, to the extent that the democratic-voice model 
operates effectively, it should also be able to utilize traditional macro 
policy tools—indeed, it should be better positioned to use them than 
more free-market oriented economies—to minimize unemployment.
73 Patnaik, Economics and Egalitarianism, p. 33.
More importantly, it should be well positioned to trade off the efficiency 
‘benefits’ of unemployment with alternative sources of efficiency.
Are voice-dominated financial systems viable within increasingly global-
ized markets?74 It is true that advanced capitalist economies with bank-
based systems, such as Japan, France, and Germany, have followed the 
worldwide trend since the 1970s in liberalizing their financial systems. 
Regulatory reforms in Japan and France have, for example, increased the 
ability of commercial banks to participate in capital markets. In Germany, 
where banks have always been active in capital markets, deregulation has 
endorsed the use of new financial instruments and the participation of 
foreign banks in domestic capital markets.75 In South Korea and other 
East Asian economies there has been general movement since the 1970s 
toward interest rate deregulation, securitization of financial markets, and 
relaxation of regulatory standards.76
At the same time, fundamental elements of the bank–based systems have 
remained intact. For example, close bank–industry relationships, such as 
the Japanese Keiretsu system, have not eroded, despite security market 
liberalization. In addition, state involvement in credit allocation remains 
strong in the bank-based systems—with the exception of Germany, 
which has never relied on this mechanism. The governments of bank-
based systems continue to receive a substantial proportion, if not the 
majority, of their economies’ saving through postal saving systems and 
similar forms of public intermediation. Given this source of funds, the 
governments are able to retain considerable influence in credit allocation 
decisions, which they exercise through their respective planning agen- 
cies.77 The fact that, over the late 1980s, active markets for corporate 
control did not develop in the traditional bank-based financial systems 
indicates that liberalization has not subverted these countries ‘dedicated 
capital’ financial relationships. It is not clear whether these voice-domi-
nated institutional forms will surrender to the pressures of global finan-
cial markets over time. For this to happen would require that the 
continued financial deepening generated through globalization would 
create ever greater—and finally irresistible—profit opportunities through 
‘fluid’ investment strategies.
In short, we leave as an open question the extent to which globalization 
represents a threat to the future viability of existing bank-based systems, 
to say nothing of democratic-voice policies. Nevertheless, the existing 
Japanese model of a bifurcated system—with an open segment that is 
free to pursue all market opportunities and a controlled ‘dedicated capital’ 
sector—appears to offer the outlines of a solution that is viable both for 
the existing bank-based systems, and, more importantly, for the develop-
74 The following discussion has benefited greatly from preliminary work on this 
question by Ilene Grabel.
75 Itzhak Swary and Barry T0pf, Global Financial Deregulation: Commercial Banking at 
the Crossroads, Cambridge, Mass. 1992, passim.
76 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, New York 
1993, pp. 339–41.
77 Ilene Grabel, ‘Saving and the Financing of Productive Investment: The 
Importance of National Financial Complexes,’ in R. Pollin, ed., The Macroeconomics 
of Finance, Saving and Investment, Ann Arbor 1996 (forthcoming).
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ment of democratic-voice policies that a progressive movement would 
want to pursue. Beyond this, the issue must be evaluated in political terms. 
If globalization is indeed destructive of egalitarianism, then progressive 
political movements will have to develop economic programmes that can 
neutralize these forces while simultaneously advancing egalitarian eco-
nomic arrangements that promote both micro efficiency and macro 
stability. My contention is that an approach guided by democratic-voice 
financial policies can provide the foundation for such an economic pro-
gramme.
Financial Systems and Forms of Property
Predominant
Financial Predominant Ownership Form 
Institutional
Framework Private Mixed Public
Exit US UK—1960s–70s —–
UK—1980s (primary public 
ownership of non-
financial firms)
Elite Voice Japan, France, Former USSR
Germany S. Korea
(primarily public 
ownership of financial 
firms)
Democratic Proposals for US Coakley/Harris Bardhan/Roemer
Voice on community Proposal Proposal 
reinvestment,
pension funds,
Federal Reserve,
security
transaction taxes
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